

# **The Socioeconomic Impact of the Transition from Technical Intern Trainees (TIT) to Specified Skilled Workers (SSW) in Japan**

技能自習生（TIT）から特定技能外国人労働者（SSW）への  
移行に伴う、日本における社会経済影響

William Brooks

## **Outline**

1. Introduction	26
2. SSW(i) Program	30
3. History of foreign workers in Japan	33
4. Recent increase of foreign workers in Japan	36
5. Problems among TIT interns and SSW(i) workers	38
6. The Government's role in TITP, SSW(i) and SSW(ii) programs	42
7. Methodology	45
8. Data Results and Analysis	46
9. Discussion	53
10. Conclusion	55
11. References	58
12. Appendix	61

## **Abstract**

The severe labor shortage in Japan over the past several decades as a result of a rapidly aging society and decreasing population could lead to potential bankruptcy of the pension and other

national welfare programs if a more proactive approach isn't taken soon. This phenomenon has forced the Japanese government and local industries to consider various ways to counterbalance it, including the implementation of programs to rapidly increase foreign labor into the country in the form of Technical Intern Trainees (TIT) interns, and the latest program, the Specified Skilled Worker SSW (I) workers which started in April of 2019.

This paper examines the historical background of foreign workers in Japan, the current situation of TIT interns, SSW(i) workers and their employers, and how well these migrant workers have adapted to work and life in Japan. The paper also includes survey and interview results from companies that employ TIT interns and SSW(i) workers, from business cooperative associations (agents), and the workers themselves.

出生率の低下、人口減少による急速な高齢化社会に伴う数十年に渡る深刻な労働力不足は、短期間に何らかの対策が打たれない場合、年金やその他の国民福祉プログラムの破綻を招く可能性があります。その為、日本政府と産業界は、技能実習生（TIT）や最新の特定技能外国人労働者 SSW (i) の形態で外国人労働者を迅速に増やすプログラムの実施を含む対応策の検討を余儀なくされています。

当論文では、日本における外国人労働者の歴史的背景、技能実習生と特定技能外国人労働者の現状、彼らが日本での仕事と生活にどのように適応してきたか、企業と市民が外国人労働者をどのように受け入れてきたかを考察します。

また、技能実習生（TIT）、特定技能外国人労働者 SSW (i) を雇用中の企業および仲介業者、外国人労働者への調査とインタビューの結果が含まれています。

## 1. Introduction

Japan has made use of immigrant labor in various work sectors and stages throughout its recent history, and over the past few decades, the exit of native Japanese specified skilled workers due to a rapidly aging society and a persistent decrease in Japan's birth rate (figure 1) has compounded the need for a swift increase in foreign labor. Without a stable workforce, significant negative ramifications could occur, including the severe depletion if not bankruptcy of the pension and/or national health-care systems. OECD (2019) notes that Japan's labor force is expected to decline 25% by 2050 if the labor market entry and exit rates remain unchanged. The labor input has been constrained by the 2018 work style reform bill, which limits overtime work to 45 hours per month and 360 hours per year (OECD, 2019). In light of this, the Japanese government and local industries have given formidable thought




Figure 1 BBC News

to various ways to compensate for this dilemma. These include extending the retirement age for Japanese skilled workers from 65 to 70, increasing the number of Japanese women in the workforce, further developing industrial automation (robots, etc.), and increasing the amount of foreign labor into the country.

### 1.1 The increase of foreign labor, JITCO

One of the initial schemes to increase foreign labor into the archipelago was the establishment of the Japan International Training Cooperation Organization (JITCO) as an incorporated foundation in 1991. JITCO (2020) later became a public interest incorporated foundation under the jurisdiction of the Cabinet Office in April 2012. JITCO's purpose was to promote the acceptance of foreign nationals, including Technical Intern Trainees (TIT) interns, and contribute to the development of the international economic community. JITCO conducts various support services, such as holding seminars, handling individual consultations, developing and providing teaching materials for involved entities, and conducting training courses for

supervisors and technical intern training managers. The TIT program (TITP) was formally established in 1993 based on high evaluations from training programs conducted by overseas companies for employee education that started in the late 1960s (JITCO, 2020). The objective of the TITP was to transfer working skills, technologies, and knowledge accumulated in Japan to developing countries and other regions in need of it. At the same time, it is designed to promote international cooperation by contributing to the development of human resources that can play significant roles in the economic development of those developing regions (JITCO, 2020). The TITP, however, stated that the fundamental principle was “technical training and shall NOT be conducted as a means of adjusting labor supply and demand (in Japan)” (Article 3, Paragraph 2 of the Act) (JITCO, 2020). The initial intentions of the TITP, according to JITCO, were to form employment *relationships* between corporations, sole proprietors, and other businesses in Japan so that trainees could master or enhance their working skills that are difficult or impossible to acquire in their home countries. Those workers would take those skills back to




Figure 2 Source: JITCO 2020

their countries after they finish their program in Japan. The training period has a minimum of three years and maximum of five, and acquisition of skills is conducted pursuant to technical intern training plans, as illustrated in figure 2 (JITCO, 2020).

## 1.2 OTIT

On January 25<sup>th</sup>, 2017, the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) with the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare (MHLW), established the Organization for Technical Intern Training (OTIT) (OTIT, 2020). Similar to the JITCO program, the purpose of OTIT is to promote international cooperation by transferring skills, technologies, or knowledge in Japanese industries to developing countries through human resource development while ensuring proper technical intern training and protection of TIT interns. OTIT functions include the accreditation of technical training plans, preliminary screening of applicants for licenses or qualifications, the support and protection for TIT interns during their stay in Japan, and research on technical intern training among other duties. According to JITCO, there have been two main procedures for accepting TIT interns until now: individual enterprises, and supervising organizations. By the end of 2016, 96.4% of acceptances were *supervising organization type* (based on the number of TIT interns present in Japan), and 3.6% were *individual enterprise type* (OTIT, 2020).

### a) Supervising organization type:

Non-profit organizations such as business cooperatives and chambers of commerce and industry that accept TIT interns at affiliated enterprises in which the training is conducted at each implementing organization (OTIT, 2020).

### b) Individual enterprise type:

Japanese enterprises, businesses, i.e., implementing organizations, accept employees of overseas local subsidiaries, joint venture companies, transaction enterprises, or trading partners for technical intern training in Japan (OTIT, 2020). Both types of programs are illustrated in figure 3.




Figure 3 Source: Ministry of Justice et al

## 2. SSW(i) Program

On December 14<sup>th</sup>, 2018, the MOJ (2018) amended the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act (ICRRA), also labeled Act No.102 of 2018, at the 197<sup>th</sup> diet extraordinary session. The content of the revised law included the formulation of residence statuses of SSW(i) worker and SSW(ii) worker, and the establishment of the Immigration Services Agency (ISA) with the purpose of rapidly increasing foreign labor into the country to compensate for its decreasing labor force. According to the MOJ, the law promulgates the issuance of 345,000 SSW(i) working visas to skilled foreigners over a five-year span. These include 47,550 that began in April of 2019, and the remaining 297,450 over the next four years. Any non-Japanese citizen who wishes to work in Japan and qualifies for the new SSW(i) worker visa can enter the country to work in any of 14 designated sectors for a maximum five-year limit, including: agriculture, aviation, building cleaning, construction, electronics and electrical equipment design and manufacturing, fishing,

food and banqueting (restaurants), food and drink manufacturing, hospitality (hotels, etc), industrial machinery design and manufacturing, materials industry design and manufacturing, nursing, shipbuilding, and vehicular maintenance (MOFA, 2020). The main reason of the act, according to JITCO (2020), was the creation of a new residency statuses for foreigners with “specific skills” who can be accepted in industries that lack workers and eventually replace the TITP. Rather than having to send trainees home after a three to five year limit upon completing their terms, local companies would rather keep those workers since they invested so much time into training them. Hence, the government eventually replaced the TITP with SSW(i) worker and SSW(ii) worker visa programs. According to Hitoshi Kashima, Board Chairman of Aichi Cooperative League of Commerce and industry, an organization which recruits, manages, and interfaces between TIT interns and SSW(i) workers, “Eventually the Japanese government will have no choice but to lengthen this program and adjust to the needs of local companies for it to survive and bear fruit” (H. Kashima, personal communication, February 21st, 2020). A major difference between TIT interns and SSW(i) workers, Kashima claims, is that TIT interns cannot legally quit or change their place of employment abruptly without prior notice of resignation as they are in Japan to “learn technical skills” from the companies they were hired by. In addition, they are not allowed to legally remain in Japan although some have disappeared from their workplaces in recent years. In contrast, an SSW(i) worker is considered a “worker of higher status”, which means s/he is assumed to already possess basic knowledge in the field s/he wishes to work in, and should have a minimum N4 level Japanese language ability, so s/he has the privilege of changing jobs at any time and legally remaining in Japan for his/her five-year term, provided s/he can find employment before or immediately after the job change occurs (Kashima, 2020). This new amendment may cause headaches for local companies, but there are few alternatives since the system needs to be attractive enough to lure and keep SSW(i) workers in the country to make up for the depleting local

workforce. By the time the five-year working term comes to an end, if the SSW(i) worker earns various certifications or acquires a higher status in the company, that worker may qualify for SSW(ii) worker status, which, under present terms, should allow him/her to apply for permanent residency, and grant his/her family the right to live with him/her in Japan from that time forward (JITCO, 2020).

## **2.1 SSW(i) Visa Conditions**

As noted above, there are several prerequisites that need to be met in order for foreign workers to acquire an SSW(i) worker visa, including the acquisition of a minimal level N4 or N3 Japanese speaking and reading ability based on the Japanese Language Proficiency Test (MOFA, 2020). Naturally an SSW(i) worker who works at a department or grocery store cash register, or at the front desk of a hotel, will need to speak more fluent Japanese than an SSW(i) worker that works on a factory assembly line. SSW(i) workers are also required to possess some degree of skills in the industry they wish to work in before entering Japan, either through experience and/or certification in their home country, or at least several years experience after working in Japan as a TIT intern (MOFA, 2020). For TIT interns currently in Japan, it is possible for them to upgrade to SSW(i) worker status when they complete their internship and/or certification, but some stipulations exist. MOFA (2020) states that an SSW(i) worker visa holder is only allowed to remain in the country for a maximum of five years, and, like TIT interns, is not permitted to bring his/her family with them. Should s/he wish to extend his/her stay or bring his/her family into the country, s/he will need to upgrade to an SSW (ii) worker visa after five years, provided s/he acquires adequate certification and/or promotion within the company s/he is employed at.

## **2.2 SSW(ii) worker Visa Conditions**

The SSW(ii) worker visa will be for those SSW(i) workers who become more

highly qualified or better experienced in their fields of work. At the time of application, the SSW(i) workers must have no criminal record history, paid local taxes, paid into the national health-care and pension schemes, and proven s/he has acquired higher language skill certification compared to the time s/he entered Japan (MOFA, 2020). However, since there is no history of SSW(ii) worker visa acquisition in Japan due to the program being so new, assessing the chances of permanent residency and overall success of the program remains ambiguous.

Although the SSW(i) worker program may be a positive alternative to the TITP to alleviate short-term labor shortages and provide better work conditions to foreign laborers, industrial analysts claim that the program may fall short of long-term expectations. Ryall (2019) writes that a significant boom in the construction sector for projects such as the 2019 Rugby World Cup and the 2021 Tokyo Summer Olympic Games caused many local companies to become desperate to fulfill their current project requirements while refusing to take on new ones. Martin Schulz, senior economist for the Fujitsu Research Institute in Tokyo, claims that the current SSW(i) worker program is merely another test case as it only experiments with new regulations and the potential future increase of foreigners assimilating into Japanese society (Ryall, 2019). Shultz emphasizes that if there is a need to suddenly increase SSW(i) worker visa holders and they successfully adjust to Japanese society while fulfilling work requirements, the law may soon be mitigated, such as allowing them to bring their families to Japan from the outset (Ryall, 2019).

### **3. History of foreign workers in Japan**

The immigration Control Act was enacted in 1951 as a fundamental law for immigration control. It was initially a cabinet order and made effective in 1952 by the “Law on the Effect of Directives Concerning the Ministry of Foreign Affairs”,

based on orders given following the acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration (law number 126 of 1952) status (Iguchi & Takayama,1993). Although the existing law has been revised more than 18 times since its inception, Mori (1993) claims that the principal legislative framework has been maintained without any substantial modification since then. However, the 1952 amendment regarding the restoration of independence of postwar Japan involved relatively large modifications, including procedures for ethnic Koreans and Chinese who had resided in Japan at the end of WWII to acquire permanent residence status (Mori, 1993). Japan experienced a high-growth period from the mid-1950s to the early 1970s. Yoshioka & Kawasaki (2016) point out that several studies indicate that this economic growth was the result of importance placed on institutional and structural changes in postwar Japan under occupied armies' control, such as *zaibatsu* dissolution, agricultural land reform, and labor democratization, etc. Still others stressed the roles of economic industrial policies of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), among others (Yoshioka & Kawasaki, 2016).

### **3.1 Initial stages of foreign labor across the archipelago**

Mori (1993) writes that in the early 1970's, big businesses in Japan closed their doors to foreigners in order to fill regular work vacancies for local Japanese on account of them being non-nationals. Mori pointed out that in 1974, big businesses were brought to trial by a Korean youth for its conventional discriminatory employment practice which had been prevalent at that time. Even in cases where foreigners were thoroughly qualified in a particular skill, had ability, experience, education, or were even superior to a national applicant, the so-called "National Clause" prohibited them finding jobs in many specified fields, especially in the public sector (Mori, 1993). Most of the immigrant workers who came to Japan for employment in the late 1960's and early 1970's were labeled as "target workers", people intending to reside for a certain period of time to achieve earning objectives,

but often could only find 3D' (dirty, dangerous, and difficult) jobs in small firms which had persistent vacancies shunned by national workers (Mori, 1993).

After two oil shocks in the 1970's, Yoshioka & Kawasaki (2016) assert that the Japanese economy shifted from high to stable growth, at approximately 5%. According to Yorimitsu (2010), in the 1980's, Japan began to utilize the foreign labor force with economic activity centered on the assembly-type and process-type automobile industry, home appliance, and electronics-related industries. Some of the key reasons that led to this change in chronological order were the 1985 Plaza Accord, the yen appreciation, and monetary easing aimed at overcoming the recession and the bubble economy (Yorimitsu, 2010). At the peak of the Japanese bubble economy in the late 1980's and early 90's, Yorimitsu notes that a serious shortage of labor in various industry sectors left the Japanese government with little choice but to open its doors to foreign workers with professional knowledge and technical skills, thus Japan became a major recipient of skilled immigrant workers for the first time. In 1981, the reform provided the legislative framework for residential status, re-entry permits, and special measures to stabilize long-term residents' status. In 1990, the immigration control system was drastically reformed in light of the accelerated accumulation of clandestine foreign workers in Japan (Iguchi & Takayama, 1993).

Despite that the number of foreign workers in Japan hit a record 1,658,804 as of October, 2019, up 13.6% from a year earlier (Kyodo News, 2020), that percentage remains rather small compared to the percentage of foreign workers (aged 20 to 64) in the EU at 64.5% in 2018 (eurostat, 2019). Meanwhile, according to Tian, Yunchen, Chung & Erin (2018), only one-fifth of Japan's foreign workers hold visas explicitly intended for labor immigration, which is restricted to SSW(i) workers. Japan's population peaked at 127.8 million in 2004, but that figure has fallen by over 1.5 million since, while the working age population dropped by over 10

million since 1997 (Tian, et al., 2018). By 2065, when current high school students are approaching retirement age, Japan’s population is expected to sink to 88 million, and due to the number of elderly local workers exiting the labor force, virtually anyone old (or young) enough to work in Japan at that time should be able to find any job s/he wants (Schiavenza, 2019).

#### 4. Recent increase of foreign workers in Japan

According to MHLW (2019), the 13.6% increase in foreign worker population in 2018 marked the highest level on record and 12th consecutive year of increases since 2007 when it became obligatory for employers to report the number of their foreign employees. By sector, as indicated in figure 4, manufacturing companies hired the largest number of foreign workers at 483,278 (29%), followed by wholesale and retail companies at 212,528 (12.8%), and hospitality at 266,503 (12.5%) (MHLW,




Figure 4



The Socioeconomic Impact of the Transition from Technical Intern Trainees (TIT) to Specified Skilled Workers (SSW) in Japan

Population and percentage of foreign workers by nationality in Japan




Figure 5 Source: MHLW, 2019

Population and percentage of foreign workers by visa in Japan




Figure 6 Source: MHLW, 2019

2019). As noted in figure 5, the number of foreign workers with Chinese nationality accounted for about a quarter of the entire foreign workforce at 418,327 (25.2%), followed by Vietnamese at 401,326 (24.2%), and Filipinos at 179,685 (10.8%) as of October, 2019 (MHLW, 2019). Concurrently, MHLW (2019) states that the number of Chinese workers rose 7.5% from a year earlier, while Vietnamese and Filipinos rose 26.7% and 9.6% respectively. By prefecture, Tokyo had the most foreign workers with 26.6% at 485,345, followed by Aichi Prefecture at 175,119, and Osaka at 105,379 (MHLW, 2019). The highest number of foreign visa holders in October, 2019 were personal status residents at 531,781 (32.1%), followed by TIT interns at 383,978 (23.1%), non-qualified activity status residents at 372,894 (22.5%), and professional & technical residents at 329,034 (20%), as indicated in figure 6 (MHLW, 2019). Meanwhile, JiJi Press (2020) writes that, according to the Immigration Services Agency, the number of foreign nationals who lived in Japan at the end of 2019 grew 7.4% from a year earlier to a record 2,933,137, while the number of illegal residents as of January 1<sup>st</sup>, 2020 grew 11.8% to 82,892, up for the sixth straight year. Among legal foreign residents in Japan, Chinese made up the largest group at 813,675, or nearly 30% of the total, followed by South Koreans at 446,364, and Vietnamese at 411,968 (JiJi Press, 2020).

## **5. Problems among TIT interns and SSW(i) workers**

Aizawa (2019) explains that until recently, the country's immigration law only granted long-term working residence status to highly skilled professionals, such as doctors, lawyers, professors and researchers. Other international workers mostly fell into two groups: technical trainees from developing countries, sent under the Japanese government aid program, and exchange students who work part-time (Aizawa, 2019). One reason why TIT interns and SSW(i) workers were not readily accepted from the start was the government's claim there would be potential

deterioration in public security, and local people would not easily accept an influx of low skilled workers. In December of 2018, Prime Minister Shinzō Abe stated that the new SSW(i) worker program was not an immigration policy and that clear quotas on the length of stay for foreign workers would be strictly enforced (Menju, 2019). The underlying assumption here, adds Menju, is that most people in Japan are still viscerally opposed to immigration as a threat to public safety and stability. However, given little choice amongst a rapidly decreasing population, the government and public will have to change their attitudes in order for the system to survive. The government will need to better clarify the guidelines for the new SSW(i) worker program. Hitoshi Kashima states:

Up till now, conditions regarding the level of TIT interns' skills before coming to Japan and the degree of knowledge they were to acquire while serving their terms here were quite ambiguous. The new SSW(i) worker program isn't much different. Specific conditions should have been clarified a long time ago to make it more attractive for foreigner workers to want to come and stay in Japan (H. Kashima, personal communication, February 21st, 2020).

Ideally, Japan's recent increase of foreign labor would enhance a multi-cultural, safe, and productive future across the archipelago, but unfortunately that reality may never happen. A considerable flow of TIT interns, SSW(i) workers and other non-Japanese residents into the country over the next few years may exacerbate problems. The first is whether incoming migrant technical workers can understand basic Japanese language, adjust to and follow local customs, rules, and laws, such as how to deal with trash pick-up, how to participate in traditional neighborhood association programs known as "chounaikai", abide by driving laws, etc. Less discernible customs include refraining from speaking loudly in public, the removal of shoes in homes and other public venues, following bath house rules, local eating

habits, etc. It is imperative that foreign workers rapidly learn and integrate smoothly into Japanese society for the SSW(i) worker program to flourish in the long-term. On the contrary, Japanese people will have to make their own adjustments as well, such as learning basic words of one or two Southeast Asian or other foreign languages, embracing some of the SSW(i) workers' cultural differences, tolerating what they believe to be inexcusable reasons from TIT interns or SSW(i) workers (or other foreigners) for being late or absent from meetings or events, and helping them to learn local customs, manners, rules, laws and the Japanese language. In order for Japan to truly become an international nation, the local people will need to become accustomed to doing the aforementioned while adjusting to an influx of foreigners living around them. Local Japanese will also need to state their thoughts and intentions more clearly to avoid misunderstanding, something that has not always been necessary in a homogeneous society.

At the work place, TIT interns and SSW(i) workers struggle while being trained amidst a difficult language and cultural barriers as they assimilate into a predominantly homogeneous society without their families. Kashima (2020) believes that, like the TIT interns, SSW(i) workers will have to adjust to unexpected overtime and attend after-hour dinners, drinking parties, or weekend corporate events in order to preserve “wa” (harmony) with their Japanese colleagues. In addition, having to work on Christmas, Easter, and other foreign national holidays, having to sacrifice evening prayer time, being scolded, chastised or even hit for making detailed mistakes or for tardiness all add to migrant workers' stress while they try to adapt to a Japanese “perfectionist” work ethic. Japanese, well known for their unique rules, morals and mannerisms, often do things that non-Japanese find difficult, such as bowing and apologizing for things that foreigners may not agree with, bringing souvenirs from trips for colleagues, or having to take turns cleaning offices or classrooms with the intent of fulfilling duty and enhancing

cooperativeness. Meanwhile, the JITCO program itself will need to improve. According to Ryotaroh Imazu, Chairman of Imaz Coporation, a sewage pipe repair and cleaning service company and subsidiary of TOEI Corporation that has employed TIT interns for the past several years, the biggest problem his company faces is not adjusting to working with TIT interns or having them adjust to their company as much as the obstacles and problems the JITCO program possesses itself. Companies who hire TIT interns and SSW (i) workers must go through a broker (placement cooperative association) to have them introduced to them. These brokers are also supposed to interface with the companies and migrant workers to assist with problems or misunderstandings. Imazu said his company had to pay an expensive introduction charge and monthly fee of ¥30,000 to a broker to manage and support their TIT interns and interface with Imaz. Imazu said the broker told his company they would earn points for participating in the program and spending countless hours training the TIT interns over the designated three-year period, and if all goes well after assessment, Imaz could extend the contract of its TIT interns from three to five years. Unfortunately, this was not the case. Imazu claims:

The broker we had to go through promised us that the aforementioned three-year TITP visa extension would surely happen, but when it came time for assessment, they told us we couldn't because our company originally hired the TIT interns before becoming a subsidiary—while we were still a division of TOEI Corporation—so the terms had changed and the TIT interns had to leave Japan after their three-year term. We have since tried to get them back, but the visa renewal procedures are far too rigorous and troublesome, so we just gave up (R. Imazu, personal communication, March 4<sup>th</sup>, 2020).

Imazu added that “despite paying expensive introduction and monthly fees, the broker did little or nothing to manage and interface between us and our TIT interns.

The brokers only seem to be in the business to exploit foreign workers and make money” (Imazu, 2020). Imazu says he has become so frustrated with the program that he may never hire TIT interns or SSW(i) workers again, and will instead employ foreign university graduate exchange students who have already mastered Japanese, adjusted to the culture, and tend to be better educated and more responsible than incoming TIT interns or SSW(i) workers.

## **6. The Government’s role in TITP, SSW(i) & SSW(ii) programs**

The influx of immigrants into any nation has a profound impact on local and federal governments as well as companies, schools and citizens that employ or accommodate them. Nevertheless, governments should take proper steps to ensure appropriate arrangements, without discrimination, on grounds of nationality, race or religion, for workmens’ compensation, medical care for workers and their families, industrial hygiene, and prevention of accidents and occupational diseases (ILO, 2017). However, Kashima (2020) believes that due to numerous complaints and lawsuits including overwork, power harassment, and harsh working conditions among other issues reported in Japan by TIT interns over the years, employment conditions for SSW(i) workers are not expected to be much different. Nevertheless, the SSW(i) program has revealed some upgrades. Kashima states that unlike TIT interns, SSW(i) workers can bypass brokers and are allowed to quit and change jobs if their general work conditions are not met. According to the MOJ, under the TITP, more than 100,000 interns have been accepted annually, but of this amount, roughly 2,000 (or 2%) go missing every year, and as of 2018, the whereabouts of more than 9,000 trainees remain unknown (Obe, 2019). To help counter this, the government has ensured that about 100 consultation centers nationwide will provide support in 11 languages, including Japanese, English, Chinese, Vietnamese, Korean, and Tagalog, and will enforce stricter screening procedures in order to eliminate

The Socioeconomic Impact of the Transition from Technical Intern Trainees (TIT) to Specified Skilled Workers (SSW) in Japan

rogue brokers who exploit migrant workers through actions such as debt-bondage (Kashima, 2020).

The latest statistics from Worldometer (2020) (figure 7) indicate that the current Japanese population in the first quarter of 2020 was 126,476,461, a decrease of 0.3% or 383,840 compared to 2019. The elderly population has been growing for seven consecutive years, while the number of foreigners living and working in Japan in 2019 exceeded 2.9 million (JiJi Press, 2020). Despite the fact that this increase has continued for five consecutive years, the proportion of that total is still less than 2% of the overall Japanese population (Nippon, 2018). Only one-fifth of Japan’s foreign workers hold visas explicitly intended for labor immigration, which is restricted




Figure 7 Source: Worldometer, 2020

to the highly skilled. In European countries and the United States, the number of foreign workers make up 20 to 30% of their total populations respectively, so the population of foreign workers living in Japan is still significantly low and needs to increase rapidly to balance the labor shortage. Without a reliable and consistent supportive immigration policy for SSW(i) workers and other non-Japanese migrating into the country, the Japanese government could face one of two problems: a program that does not balance the diminishing local population, and problems of runaways and employee lay-off issues resulting in a surplus of unemployed foreigners remaining in the country (Kashima, 2020). This incident occurred in the early 1990's after the central government ordered embassies abroad to discontinue issuing racial background confirmation certificates to migrant workers in Japan in order to stop 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> generation nikkei workers from extending their work visas. Many immigrant workers remained stranded in the country for several months as visa overstayers who couldn't leave and had to struggle to survive due to that failed policy.

### **6.1 Improvement of the SSW(i) program**

In light of the aforementioned, the Japanese government has ensured that SSW(i) workers will receive better treatment since the new program began in 2019. In order to alleviate problems such as the disappearance of interns or workers due to employment grievances, the government has established a system that ensures foreign employees can receive proper medical insurance, enroll in the pension system, acquire multilingual language support and a hotline help service, and contact Hello Work Employment support for layoff situations (Obe, 2019). In addition, information exchange will be strengthened with related organizations such as the Organization for Technical Intern Training (OTIT) and the MHLW (MOJ, 2019). After quickly and broadly evaluating information on implementing organizations, supervising organizations, and unscrupulous intermediary business operators,

the MOJ announced that stricter examinations and on-site inspections will be thoroughly implemented, including efforts to eliminate sycophantic brokers through austere operations such as revocation of licenses of supervising organizations and accreditation of the SSW(i) program (MOJ, 2019).

## **7. Methodology**

### **7.1 Companies, TIT interns and SSW(i) worker surveys**

With assistance from the Aichi Cooperative League of Commerce and industry (ACLCI) and Imaz Corporation, interviews and surveys were conducted with TIT interns and SSW(i) workers, their employers, and business cooperative associations (ACLCI) to determine the overall success of the JITCO program. In particular, it was important to assess how well TIT interns and SSW(i) workers have adjusted to work in Japan, in addition to how the transition from the TITP to the SSW(i) program has progressed since the SSW(i) program began in April, 2019. A total of two questionnaires were drafted for the survey and carried out with 36 local companies, ranging from manufacturing to care worker dispatch entities that are employing TIT interns and SSW(i) workers. It was originally decided to draft a third questionnaire for local citizens to assess how well they have accepted TIT interns and SSW(i) workers potentially living around them, but that questionnaire was discontinued due to time restraints, the small population of SSW(i) workers currently dwelling in Japan, and issues related to the covid-19 virus. According to ACLCI, all 36 companies that participated in the survey were employing very few if any SSW(i) workers at that time, and that exact figure was not disclosed by the respondents. It is assumed, however, that with the transition from the TITP to the SSW(i) program, eventually all TIT interns will either become SSW(i) workers or finish their employment terms in Japan and return to their home countries leaving only SSW(i) workers in the country within the next few years. It should also be

noted that totals for some questions did not equal the number of companies surveyed because some companies did not answer every question. Regarding TIT interns and SSW(i) workers, 63 responded to the questionnaire and have been living and working in Japan between one and three years. The respondents included 25 Indonesians, 19 Chinese, 16 Vietnamese, six Burmese, three Thai, two Indians, one Filipino, and one Mongolian.

## **7.2 The questionnaire**

A total of 10 questions were proposed to local companies in the Chubu region and TIT interns and SSW(i) workers respectively, and the survey was conducted over a one-month period. Questions included a mix of multiple choice and short answers (see Appendix I). In addition to responding to interviews, ACLCI distributed the questionnaires to various companies, and the Imaz Corporation was interviewed and surveyed separately. Data from the survey was gathered and the results calculated using excel spreadsheets, and graphs were constructed to simplify the results as shown in part eight below.

# **8. Data Results and Analysis**

## **8.1 Survey results from companies**

In regards to the 36 companies that participated in the survey, the majority were construction and engineering, and included framework construction, industrial machinery repair, pipe installation, interior construction, urethane spraying, scaffold assembly and construction, gas pipe installation, exterior painting, plumbing, plastic molding, civil construction and pavement, and housing exterior installation. Twelve companies confirmed they were very satisfied with their TIT interns, nine noted they were rather satisfied, five indicated that they couldn't say either way, one company answered unsatisfied, and nine did not respond. In terms of the **positive effects** of

The Socioeconomic Impact of the Transition from Technical Intern Trainees (TIT) to Specified Skilled Workers (SSW) in Japan




Figure 8

employing TIT interns and SSW(i) workers, companies noted the following reasons: the interns and workers are serious, hard-working, and do a very good job; they are obedient; learn quickly; they aggressively try to find other tasks to do without being told beforehand; they set good examples for other young Japanese coworkers; they make positive effort to learn new tasks; they rarely take holidays; they have adequate to good Japanese speaking skills.

**Negative effects (problems)** included: the Japanese language barrier (20 companies); TIT interns do not always follow work rules (three companies); TIT interns do not follow orders from their superiors (one company); and no response (12 companies). Reasons included TIT interns often say “yes” to every order without really understanding what was being said, and companies cannot understand what the TIT interns are really thinking because they do not discuss anything with local staff (two companies).

Regarding whether companies want TIT interns or SSW(i) workers to work beyond their three to five-year contracts, 18 companies confirmed they want them




Figure 9

to work longer; five said they can't say either way; one noted they want their TIT interns to finish early, and 12 did not respond. Feedback included: companies want to hire their TIT interns or SSW(i) workers as regular employees indefinitely after their three to five year term finishes; they want them to return to their home countries to start a branch of the Japanese company or become an independent contractor using the skills they learned in Japan; they do not want to keep the TIT interns longer unless workers' families are allowed into Japan; they want their TIT interns to become construction site leaders (foremen) in the future. Care worker facilities noted they hope their TIT interns will acquire national healthcare certification in order to work in Japan indefinitely.

With respect to what companies want the most from their TIT interns and SSW(i) workers, nine said they want to leave more responsible tasks to them; eight emphasized that they want to see them get better benefits from the government; six responded "other", and 13 did not respond to the question. Responses included: they want their TIT interns and SSW(i) workers to learn and follow safety procedures and site management regulations more closely; they want them to study Japanese more,

learn the job flow and rules, and not cause any problems. They also want their TIT interns and SSW(i) workers to understand the good points of Japan (culture, cuisine, manners, etc.), do their jobs with perfection and no complaints, learn job-specific expertise and take it back to their countries, care more about their work relationships with colleagues, and get a driver's license.

In regards to whether companies believe TIT interns and SSW(i) workers are essential to make up for the decrease of Japanese skilled workers, as noted in figure 10, 21 companies said yes, only two said no, and 13 did not respond. Reasons for “yes” included: there are too few young Japanese workers left to hire, young Japanese do not want to do 3D (dirty, dangerous, difficult) work and are too fastidious, young native workers easily quit hard labor jobs while TIT interns and SSW(i) workers work harder, are more tenacious, and are more serious about their work than their Japanese peers. Despite that the Japanese media has a tendency to write negative things about migrant workers, many companies view their immigrant workers as “family members” whom they have developed close relationships with. In regards to question nine, “Are companies thinking about hiring SSW(i) workers to replace TIT interns in the future”, four answered they were definitely thinking about



Figure 10

it, 10 noted they want to hire them full-time, and 22 did not respond. Contrarily, three noted they do not want to hire TIT interns or SSW(i) workers in the future, and six answered they weren't sure, stating reasons that included: there are not enough staff to train the TIT interns or SSW(i) workers; they want more experienced migrant workers; they have no choice but to hire migrant workers because they can't find any young Japanese to do the same work. Meanwhile, health-care firms noted that the rules laid out by the Japanese government for this industry are too vague or unfit for current TIT interns or SSW(i) care workers in the country, so they may not rehire them in the future.

## 8.2 Survey results from TIT interns and SSW(I) workers

TIT interns and SSW(i) workers were given 10 questions to answer including multiple choice and short answers. With regard to treatment from their bosses and colleagues, question two (figure 11) shows that 38 answered very good, 24 responded good, and one couldn't say either way. Reasons for positive responses included: "my boss has a good personality and is easy to consult with for work and personal problems"; "Our boss and co-workers treat us like family"; "the boss teaches us Japanese language, customs, jokes often, and is there when needed". In



Figure 11




Figure 12

relation to overtime hours, 11 noted they worked 40 or more hours per month; 12 answered 20 hours or more per month; 17 indicated 17 hours or more per month; and 23 responded they did not have to do overtime. Regarding salary and wages, question three (figure 12), 14 noted they were very satisfied, 43 responded they were satisfied, four said they couldn't say either way, and two answered they were unsatisfied. Question five: "Is your salary and overtime paid properly and on time?", 61 responded yes and two said they were not sure. Question six inquired about whether the TIT interns or SSW(i) workers could consult easily with their superiors about abuse or harassment issues, 62 responded yes and only one said no. Reasons included "our co-workers were kind and discussed anything with us", "our co-workers made time to discuss any matters and inquired about existing problems". Question seven asked: "Do you think what you learned will help you in your future?", 55 replied yes, one answered no, and seven did not respond. Points included: "the kind of work we were doing does not exist back in our home country and our employer wants us to master skills and start a subsidiary company upon returning"; "the company wants us to search for related jobs in our home countries upon returning and continue using the skills we learned in Japan"; they want



Figure 13

workers to teach Japanese language, etiquette and work customs upon returning to their home countries; “we learned the value of being punctual, work ethic, and hope we can teach those values to our peers upon returning”. Care-workers noted: “the requirements for getting a care-worker license in Japan are completely different from those in Indonesia, so we cannot bring the skills we learned in Japan back home.” Question eight asked “What was the overall assessment of your experience working in Japan” (figure 13), 34 responded very good, 23 answered good, four noted they couldn’t say good or bad, and two did not answer. Reasons for positive assessment included: TIT interns and SSW(i) workers were able to learn many different types of job skills efficiently; they had a great experience living in Japan despite some difficulties with the language and work expectations; they improved their work efficiency and effectiveness quickly; they maintained a positive perspective towards labor jobs; it was the first time to work and communicate with people outside of their own country; they learned the spirit of doing an excellent job. Negative responses included: Japanese work ethic is too strict and requires too many unnecessary things; sometimes our Japanese co-workers were too strict or mean. Question nine was about the TIT interns’ and SSW(i) workers’ “Overall impression

of Japan and Japanese people”, 48 answered kind; 12 responded friendly; two noted bad, and one did not answer the question. Reasons included: “the president of the company bought rice and food for us”; “our colleagues were very polite”; “Japanese workers were very strict but kind”; “The Japanese environment and buildings are clean”; “we felt like we were a member of our boss’ family”; “we realized our dream of coming to Japan”. Question 10 asked “Do you still want to work in Japan after your TITP or SSW(i) program contract expires?”, 50 noted yes; four responded no; seven answered they were not sure, and two did not respond. Reasons included: “we will return to Japan if given the chance or if our work contract is extended.”

## **9. Discussion**

### **9.1 Analysis of survey results**

It is still too early to determine the true success of the SSW(i) program which just started in April, 2019 and will eventually replace the TITP. Furthermore, the survey results revealed that very few if any companies have yet to employ SSW(i) workers and are still making use of the TITP. In the near future, SSW(i) workers are expected to replace TIT interns altogether, so a more accurate assessment of SSW(i) workers should be acquired at that time.

Despite obtaining some negative feedback from sources such as Imazu Corporation regarding the TITP, the survey results revealed an overall positive image—that most Japanese companies who hired TIT interns and SSW(i) workers were quite satisfied with their performance, and the TIT interns and SSW(i) workers noted positive responses about their employers. Japanese companies find migrant workers imperative to counteract a steadily retiring elderly specified skilled workforce, while younger Japanese dislike or avoid specified skilled and 3D jobs. Meanwhile, many TIT interns and SSW(i) workers noted they have benefited from

learning specified skills from Japanese companies, and although some favored the idea of returning to their home countries to use those skills in the near future, many would like to continue working and living in Japan for longer periods of time if given the chance. On the contrary, a minority of companies expressed dissatisfaction with their TIT interns and SSW(i) workers for reasons including language barriers, lack of effort to follow rules and learn work flow processes efficiently, and the inability to accept Japanese culture or way of life. Meanwhile, a few workers, mainly Chinese and Indonesian, noted that their Japanese coworkers were too strict, too detailed about what they labelled mundane issues, or felt their work experience was irrelevant to what is required of them in their home countries. Indonesian care-workers stated that Japanese licenses and work content was significantly different from that in their home country. In spite of the above, the overall survey results revealed that the TITP and SSW(i) program seem to be functioning well and have the potential to counterbalance Japan's shrinking workforce. Nonetheless, to further attract skilled migrant workers to Japan, the government will need to take further steps to improve unaddressed issues. Yuichiro Tamaki, leader of the centrist Democratic Party for the People, called the new SSW(i) program by Prime Minister Shinzō Abe a "half-cooked, insufficient bill", voicing concern about proper wages and social services for foreign workers, and becoming the first party leader to support a European-style immigration policy that ensures equal pay for equal work and allow foreign workers to immediately bring their families to Japan (McCurry, 2018). The government has yet to pass a bill that mitigates Tamaki's suggestions in addition to guaranteeing longer or indefinite work contracts. Until these pending issues are resolved, Japan may never establish suitable international employment standards needed to attract an adequate number of migrant workers to balance its declining native workforce.

For future surveys, it may be advisable to include an assessment from local

citizens to field their impressions about the gradual increase of foreign workers living around them and how well they are accepting or struggling with these workers rapidly integrating into Japanese society. It may also be necessary to investigate the professional status of some brokers sponsoring TIT interns and SSW(i) workers who have notoriously exploited the program by not providing adequate liaison measures between TIT interns, SSW(i) workers and the companies that hire them.

## **10. Conclusion**

The severe labor shortage in Japan over the past several decades as a result of a rapidly aging society and decreasing population could lead to potential bankruptcy of the pension and other national welfare programs if further action isn't taken soon. The Japanese government and local industries have considered various ways to compensate for this phenomena, including the extension of the retirement age for Japanese skilled workers from 65 to 70, increasing the number of Japanese women in the workforce, more rapid development of industrial automation (robots), and allowing an influx of foreign skilled labor into the country. It appears that increasing the number of migrant workers into Japan is the quickest short-term means of stabilizing this issue.

Japan has a history of employing migrant workers, and after the burst of the economic bubble in the early 1990's, the JITCO Technical Intern Trainee program (TITP) was introduced in 1993. This allowed thousands of migrant workers into the country to alleviate the decline in local technicians under a three to five-year "intern trainee program". Although survey results of the TITP revealed that it has been quite successful since its establishment nearly three decades ago, some companies have abused the system and cases of harassment and exploitation emerged, leading several TIT interns to disappear from their work places and litigation issues to arise

(Kashima, 2020). To resolve some of the aforementioned problems, the introduction of the Specified Skilled Workers (SSW(i) program occurred in April, 2019. This program promises to provide better employment conditions for foreign workers, but unlike the TITP, requires SSW(i) workers to possess technical skills upon entering Japan. The SSW(i) program is designed to eventually replace the TITP, but in the same way the TITP began with an unsteady start, the SSW(i) program also faced several hurdles, including politicians denounced it from the onset, claiming it might jeopardize the safety of the nation while others alleged it will curtail employment opportunities for local Japanese (Kashima, 2020). In December 2018, Prime Minister Abe stated that the new SSW(i) program was not an immigration policy and that clear quotas on the period of workers' stay in Japan would be strictly enforced (Menju, 2019). These political actions signify that the government remains reluctant to inaugurate a program that gives maximum benefits and equal rights to foreign workers with specified skills, and if left unaddressed, could impede the increase of foreign labor necessary to sustain the program in the future. Another pending issue is the stipulation that SSW(i) workers are not allowed to bring their families with them to Japan for five years, or until acquiring SSW(ii) worker status, which significantly devaluates the program. In addition, the success of SSW(i) category workers will depend on how well-prepared local companies that employ them in the eligible business sectors are in terms of creating a suitable employment environment (Kondo, 2019). It is also imperative that Japanese people gradually accept the increase of migrant workers, mostly from Southeast Asia, over the next several years as Japan becomes a less homogeneous society.

The results from the survey indicated that most TIT interns and SSW(i) workers and their employers are currently getting along well and have developed positive relationships, but the Japanese public's fear of change and increase of crime across the archipelago due to a swift increase in foreign workers remain lingering issues. In

reality, the crime rate has been decreasing among both local Japanese and foreigners living and visiting Japan. Over the past two decades, Osumi (2019) notes that, according to the MOJ, the total number of criminal acts committed in Japan in 2018 dropped to 817,339, declining for the 16<sup>th</sup> consecutive year, and despite the recent increase in foreign visitors and residents in Japan, their number of crimes dropped to 10,065 in 2018 from its peak of 43,622 in 2005 (Osumi, 2019). According to the National Police Agency, the overall total number of criminal offenses recorded in Japan in 2019 dropped 8.4% to 748,623, hitting a postwar low for the fifth straight year (the Japan Times, 2020). When focusing on serious crimes and theft, the crime rate amongst Japanese is much higher than that of foreigners even at its peak of 0.125% in 2006, so it is fully conceivable that the Japanese will be more likely to become involved in criminal organizations and criminal acts than foreigners who stay temporarily in Japan (SEMIB, 2019). Su (2019) notes that local news articles about foreigners committing crimes in Japan are quite different from those of locals. Those reports show foreigners' full names, professional backgrounds, home towns, and facial photos when they are arrested. Under no circumstances, states Su, do media reports of Japanese criminals directly make note of where their hometowns are within Japan. By accentuating foreign criminals' geographical origins while ignoring those of Japanese, the local media are subtly linking criminality with foreigners, while dismissing corresponding ties with origins for the Japanese (Su, 2019). Given the above, the myth of crime increasing due to an influx of foreigners into the country can be considered a racist myth perpetuated by the local media and politicians. The aforementioned points along with questions regarding the legal status of some brokers sponsoring TIT interns and SSW(i) workers who notoriously have taken advantage of the program will be issues for further research. In the meantime, Prime Minister Abe and his cabinet will need to strongly consider abolishing the quotas they've established on the period SSW(i) workers can stay in Japan and allow them to bring their families with them from the start of their work

term if they hope to realize any solution to the rapidly declining native workforce.

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The Socioeconomic Impact of the Transition from Technical Intern Trainees (TIT) to Specified Skilled Workers (SSW) in Japan

Appendix A

Questionnaires for Companies which hired TITs & SSW(I)												
1	Type of company	a 製造 mfg	b 物流 distribution	c サービス service	d 建設 construction	e 看護・介護 Nurse/CW	f 電機 electronics	g 自動車 auto	h 飲食 food	i 農業 farming	j その他 other	
	Details	framework construction, repair of industrial machinery, piping company, plastic molding, civil construction, housing exterior construction, reinforcement work, urethane spraying, scaffold assembly, scaffold construction, piping & plumbing construction, gas piping installation, scaffold assembly, reinforcement work, civil engineering pavement, exterior paint, hospital, nursing home, piping replacement										
2	nationality, # of TITs	a Vietnam	b China	c Thai	d Philippine	e Cambodia	f Indonesia	g Nepal	h Myanmar Burmese	i Mongolia	j India	k other
		16	19	3	1				6	1	2	
3	Evaluation	a very satisfied	b rather satisfied	c Can't say	d Unsatisfied							
	Reason	12	9	5	3							
	Reason	Does work seriously, personality is very good, serious & works very hard but can't drive, work very hard, serious and obedient (pure), serious & work hard, the TIT learned quickly and is serious so everyone satisfied (level is high), work hard, can't speak Japanese so takes too much time to teach them, tries to find other things to do on the job, only five months so don't know yet, try very hard to learn work, Japanese level is high, serious about work & learning it, can't speak Japanese and customs are too different, not enough Japanese										
4a	Effects	Doesn't take holidays, work continues smoothly, found out how good regular employees attitudes are towards TIT, don't have to worry about any of the TITs quitting within the three years of employment, work efficiency is good, young TIT staff are loved by all patients in nursing homes, the atmosphere of the company has improved thanks to presence of the TIT, TITs work hard & are good examples, for young Japanese, the TIT taught us about Myanmar culture, we hope the TIT brings back the tech skills they learned in Japan to their mother country for good use, motivation of regular employees went up, TITs have good personalities & are easy to talk to, the work environment became lively, co-worker atmosphere improved, TITs are strong										
4b	Problems	a Don't follow rules or policy of the co.	b Don't follow orders from boss	c Not serious	d Other							
		20	3	1	1	2						
	Reason	After working one year, mistakes coming out, can't explain illness when going to hospital, can't speak Japanese so we don't know their true feelings, matter of time till they master Japanese, positive thinking and active worker & trusts boss, hard to get details across, say yes, yes to every order but don't always understand what is being said										
5	TIT max term is three years	a Want the TIT to stay longer	b Can't say either way	c Have them finish within five years	d Want them to finish early	e other						
		18	6		1							
	Reasons, comments	Company wants the TITs to stay for 10 years, want to eventually hire the TIT as a regular employee, want the TIT to become independent and continue working in Japan, want the TIT to continue at least five years, it is up to the TIT how long they want to stay, want the TIT to get permanent visa after five years, only three years because TITs can't see their families for so long, want them to stay for 10 years, want to employ the TIT forever, want to bring up the TIT to be a leader at construction sites in the future, want the TIT to work longer and get care worker license, company's rank for TIT employment was lowered by government evaluation, so can't retire, too early to answer because TIT has started working only from one year ago.										
6	What co. wants from TITs	a better benefits	b Want to leave responsible work to TIT	c Want TIT to experience different work	d other							
	Reason	8	9		6							
	Reason	hope they make a company in Myanmar after learning tech from Japan, want the TIT to work longer										
7	What do you want TITs to learn the most	Wants TIT to learn and follow the safety procedures more, wants TIT to learn more Japanese and safety procedures, want TITs to learn work and Japanese more quickly, want TITs to understand and learn about the good of Japan, want TITs to never forget a serious mind, do work perfectly so there are no complaints, want them to communicate more with Japanese people, learn Japanese & then expertise, want TITs to learn job skill & Japanese to take back to their home country, care more about their jobs and work relationships, want TITs to learn work procedures & site management, learn the value of safety, learn more Japanese to improve the flow of work, learn Japanese, follow rules & don't cause problems with Japanese staff & listen more carefully to orders, learn the importance of care work, want the TITs to learn Japanese and care worker skills more so they can read & write Japanese get drivers license										
8	Do you think using TITs is essential to make up for lack of Japanese workers	a Yes	b No	c Still don't know (too early)								
		21	2									
	Reason	There are no more young Japanese workers so need TIT workers, young Japanese don't like hard work, TITs work hard and won't quit company easily, lack of people so TITs will be the strength of the future, can't find other foreign people to hire other than TITs, can choose the best from many applicants, young Japanese take JK work so need foreign workers, lack of workforce, want them to learn Japanese tech skills to bring back to Myanmar & make subsidiary there, the Japanese media only say bad things about the TIT program, but many companies see TITs as family members, more ambitious than young Japanese workers, young Japanese workers are too picky about work, lack of care workers, can't communicate, can do even simple jobs without direction										
9	Are you thinking about hiring SSW(I) as well as TITs	a Thinking about	b Want to hire	c thought about but don't want	d Don't know							
		4	10	3	6							
	Reason	There's no one to train the SSW(I) in company, so the company will stop at TITs and SSW(I), lack of young Japanese, never thought about hiring TITs up until now, so can't answer, want someone with more experience, want development of Japan & Myanmar, this is the time of coexistence, government rules are unclear so won't continue hiring TITs and SSW(I), TIT care workers skill are are unfit for nursing home work, so thinking about hiring SSW, depends upon how much Japanese they can learn										

## Appendix B

Questionnaire for TITs & SSW(i)								
1	<b>Type of company</b>	a 製造 mfg	b 物流 distributi on	c 建設 CONSTRU CTION	e 介護 HC	f 電機 electronic s	g 自動車関 連 auto	h その他 other
		6		27	10			
2	<b>Company/ boss good or bad</b>	Very good	Good	Can't say	Bad			
		38	24	1				
3	<b>Overtime</b>	a 40 or more hours	b 20 or more hours	c about 10 hours	d nothing			
		11	12	17	23			
4	<b>Salary</b>	Unsatisfie d	Can't say	Satisfied	Very satisfied			
		2	4	43	14			
5	<b>Salary &amp; overtime paid properly</b>	a Yes	b No	c weren't sure				
		61		2				
6	<b>Can you consult w/ co. about harrassment or abuse</b>	Yes	No					
		62	1					
7	<b>Do you think what you learn will help you in the future</b>	a helpful	b not helpful					
		55	1					
8	<b>Overall assessment of your experience working in Japan</b>	Very good	Good	Can say either way	not good			
		34	23	4				
9	<b>Impression of Japan and Japanese people</b>	a Kind	b Friendly	c Cold	d Discrimin atory	e NA		
		48	12			2		
10	<b>Do you still want to work in Japan after your TIT or SSW(i) contract expires?</b>	a Yes	b No	c Don't know, unsure				
		50	4	7				