Abstract

Tō-A Dōbun Shoin and Its China Study Curriculum: Thinking Outside the Box

Douglas R. Reynolds

As an educational institution, Tō-A Dōbun Shoin is unique in world history. Its model and inspiration was Nis-Shin Bōeki Kenkyūjo, a non-governmental institution established in China in 1890 by Arao Sei (d. 1896), using creative methods of financing and of student recruitment. In 1900-01, Tō-A Dōbun Shoin was founded in Nanjing and relocated soon after to Shanghai. Organized from below at the initiative of Arao associates like Nezu Hajime and Inoue Masaji, with sponsorship by Prince Konoe Atsumaro and Tō-A Dōbun Kai, it was committed to Arao Sei’s fundamental purposes, methods, and goals. Its China study curriculum aimed at training young Japanese in a thorough knowledge of China in order to promote Japan-China trade, and its study program became the world’s first example of an area studies (chiiki kenkyū 地域研究) curriculum. Significantly, its sophisticated curriculum appeared long before Area Studies in the United States. The latter was initiated by the US government from above for national security reasons after World War II. Tō-A Dōbun Shoin and its China study curriculum arose from below, the result of individuals like Arao, Nezu, and Konoe thinking “outside the box.” The phrase “thinking outside the box,” virtually unknown in Japan but celebrated in the United States, fits Tō-A Dōbun Shoin perfectly.
Tō-A Dōbun Shoin and Its China Study Curriculum: Thinking Outside the Box

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This essay briefly reexamines Tō-A Dōbun Shoin, its founding goals, and its China Study curriculum as positive results of thinking “outside the box,” while looking at these also from a global, post-Cold War perspective.

The essay is organized into three parts. First, it reviews the origins, vision, and methods of Arao Sei to understand “the real China” from 1886 until his death in 1896, with the cooperation and support of Nezu Hajime and others. Second, it looks at the methods of recruitment of students in Japan, before and after the founding of Tō-A Dōbun Shoin in 1900-01. The success of student recruitment, especially after 1901, resulted in a Japanese student body with carefully chosen young men from all over Japan. Third, it examines the China Study curriculum of Tō-A Dōbun Shoin from an “Area Studies” perspective, comparing that to the United States. The China Study curriculum of Tō-A Dōbun Shoin from 1900 was built on that of Nis-Shin Bōeki Kenkyūjo (1890-93), and became the world’s first example of a true area studies program. Significantly, both Nis-Shin Bōeki Kenkyūjo and Tō-A Dōbun Shoin were original ideas conceived from below, from the bottom up. These are examples of thinking outside the box – a theme that runs throughout the history of Tō-A Dōbun Shoin. Half a century later, after World War II, the United States government “reinvented” area studies conceived from above, from the top down, in the service of American strategic interests. The essay ends with some final thoughts.

To Understand China: The Vision of Arao Sei and Nezu Hajime

Arao Sei 荒尾精 (1859-96) was a man of analytical mind, penetrating insight, leadership skills, and resolute persistence. His relevance to the topic of Tō-A Dōbun Shoin and its China Study curriculum results from his combined efforts at data gathering inside of China from his base at Hankou (“the Osaka of China”), 1886-89; his establishment of Nis-Shin Bōeki Kenkyūjo 日清貿易研究所 (Japan-China Trade Research Institute) in Shanghai, 1890-93; his ongoing reminders to military and non-military Japanese audiences of the importance of trade with China and of accurate information about China; and the publication of his Hankou data in a landmark work in Tokyo in 1892, discussed below. Although he died of cholera in Taiwan in October 1896, his efforts, methods, and determined commitment inspired Tō-A Dōbun Kai and associated individuals to found Tō-A Dōbun Shoin in 1900-01. Much has been written about this remarkable man who
died at the young age of 37. The fullest accounts of his life and career include Inoue Masaji, *Kyojin Arao Sei* [Arao Sei, A Giant] (1910; photoreprint, 1994) (1) and *Tō-A Dōbun Shoin Daigaku shi* [History of Tō-A Dōbun Shoin College] (1982). (2)

Arao Sei, in his own words, started his career as a “total military man” (*zentai gunjin* 全体軍人). Then, in 1886, at his personal request, the Army General Staff (Sanbō Honbu 參謀本部) sent him to China to investigate among other things the reasons for Japan’s repeated failures at trade with China. To pursue this mission, Arao basically reinvented himself as a “commercial and industrial middleman” (*shōkōgyō shūsenyaku* 商工業の周旋役). In this role, Arao’s passion quickly turned to understanding the real China at its grassroots level, particularly its internal trade practices and customs. (3)

Ignorance of China had been a justification for sending Arao on his 1886 mission. In fact, Japan prior to 1886 was already quite knowledgeable about China. One influential book published before 1882 was *Shinkoku heiyō chiri shi* 清国兵要地理史 [A Strategic Geography of China], compiled by the Japanese Ministry of the Interior’s Bureau of Geography (Naimushō Chirikyoku 内務省地理局). When Chinese diplomat Yao Wendong 姚文棟 (1852-1927) arrived in Japan in 1882, he was startled by this book’s popularity especially inside the military. Yao, a specialist in strategic geography from Shanghai, regarded this publication as a threat to China’s national security. He immediately began to translate a counterpart publication on Japan, Nakane Shuku’s 中根淑 (1839-1913) *Heiyō Nihon chiri shōshi* 兵要日本地理小誌 [Strategic Geography of Japan: A Primer], first published by the Japanese army in 1873 and ultimately appearing in ten different editions. Yao’s translation into Chinese, which borrowed the term *heiyō* (*bingyao* 兵要) in its title, incorporated additional materials and notes, and was published in China in 1884 by the Zongli Yamen 總理衙門 under the title *Riben dili bingyao* 日本地理兵要 [Japan’s Geography and Its Defense]. In 1884, however, Yao’s “boss” in China, Li Hongzhang 李鴻章 - the Beiyang Dachen 北洋大臣 who oversaw China’s foreign relations with Japan - ordered Yao to stop compiling materials on Japanese geography and strategic matters. Astonishingly, for the next ten years up to the Nis-Shin Sensō 日清戦争 (Sino-Japanese War) of 1894-95, as a result of Li’s preoccupation with internal Chinese matters and his fear of attacks by court and regional factions, not one report on Japanese geography or strategic matters was published or circulated in China. (4)

This neglect, attributable to Li Hongzhang, is no small reason for the defeat in 1894-95 of China’s superior navy by the smaller (but better trained) Japanese navy.

In the case of Japan’s knowledge of China, Arao while in China confirmed his belief that Japan’s main missing knowledge was grassroots information about “the real China” (*jitchi* 実地). (5) The leading historical accounts of Arao all mention his arrival in Shanghai in 1886 and his early contact with businessman Kishida Ginkō 岸田吟香 (1833-1905) - founder and head of Rakuzendō 楽善
堂，a bookstore and retail shop in Shanghai that sold Kishida’s famous patented eye medicine Seikisui 精錡水. Arao arranged to open and manage a branch Rakuzendō in Hankou where for three years, 1886-89, he learned on the job and confirmed that “the best way for Japan to build up its strength to cope with foreign powers and to expand its national prestige is to devise better ways to promote the development of commerce and industry and to bring in foreign capital.” (6) In Hankou, he invited a dozen young Japanese already in China to join him. He organized them into inner and outer units with assignments to compile data from published materials for China as a whole, supplemented by selective field investigations. (7) In 1889-90, Arao returned to Japan to pursue one part of his new life mission. This was the establishment in Shanghai of a dream project, Nis-Shin Bōeki Kenkyūjo, founded in fact in September 1890. This school offered a three-year practical curriculum geared to learning about China, including intensive study of Chinese and English, plus a mandatory fourth year of field travel and investigation. (8) At the new institute, Nezu Hajime, a fellow military officer and close friend whom the Army General Staff seconded to Arao, headed the gargantuan project of compiling Arao’s China data into the three-volume landmark compilation, Shinkoku tsūshō sōran: Nis-Shin bōeki hikkei 清国通商綜覧: 日清貿易必携 [China Trade Handbook: Essentials of Japan-China Trade], published in Tokyo in 1892. (9)

Nezu Hajime 根津一 (1860-1927) is rightly known as “the founding father of Tō-A Dōbun Shoin” (書院建学の父). (10) The authoritative work Tō-A Dōbun Shoin Daigaku shi declares further that “Had the two pioneer figures [Arao and Nezu] not met, it is possible that neither Tō-A Dōbun Kai nor Tō-A Dōbun Shoin would have ever been born.” (11) The gifted Nezu, one year younger than Arao, trained at Shikan Gakkō for nearly five years, from 1879 to 1883, in the various specialties of infantry, cavalry, artillery, and engineering, graduating with the rank of artillery captain. At Shikan Gakkō he befriended Arao, a cadet from 1880 to 1882, who graduated with the rank of infantry captain. During these years, the two shared their concerns about Japan’s future relationships with China (and fears of Russia), and remained in touch up to and during Arao’s stay in China. (12) In 1889, when Arao returned to Japan from China, he submitted a lengthy summary report to the General Staff, dated May 10, 1889, then resigned his military commission in order to devote himself fully to trade matters including the planning and promotion of his Nis-Shin Bōeki Kenkyūjo, with Nezu as a key consultant. At this school’s founding in September 1890, Nezu was seconded by the military to this school where he served as deputy director (dairi shochō 代理所長) under Arao, functioning as Arao’s “second self” (isshin dōtai 一心同体) or alter ego in Arao’s absence during frequent fundraising trips back to Japan to save his school from financial ruin. (13) Arao and Nezu formed a tight team at the school, to the extent that it is impossible to imagine Tō-A Dōbun Shoin without the genius of Arao, the Kenkyūjo, and Nezu’s practical educational experience inside China.
Both Arao and Nezu are exemplars of the remarkable number of outstanding men able to think “outside the box,” and who appeared in Japan during the early Meiji period - as if out of nowhere. Both men rose by merit from lower ranks of the military, were admitted to Shikan Gakkō where they excelled, then rose to serve in the Army General Staff. Their shared concerns about China and Asia led both to forfeit secure elite military careers in favor of uncertain careers in China trade and education. From a global perspective, their abilities and their “sacrifice” are notable.

The Recruitment of Students in Japan

In 1889, while in Japan promoting his idea of a school of business and trade in China, Arao expressed the view that he hoped for public-spirited Japanese businessmen and local governments to sponsor the expenses of promising students who after graduation would return to Japan and specialize in Sino-Japanese trade. To this end, Arao traveled to numerous metropolitan and prefectural centers with letters of introduction from top central government officials. (14) Warmly welcomed but unable to secure local funding, Arao turned back to the central government and the military. A change in government caused promised central funds to evaporate, however. It required added appeals to the military and government, supplemented by personal funds of Arao and Nezu, to open Nis-Shin Bōeki Kenkyūjo in September 1890. In the first class of 150 students, only ten or so were publicly-funded students (kōhisei 公費生) enrolled from merely the two prefectures of Ishikawa 石川県 and Fukuoka 福岡県. (15)

In June 1893, after a major triumph of graduating eighty-nine students but faced with unremitting financial crises, Arao closed Nis-Shin Bōeki Kenkyūjo and returned to Japan. (16) Over the next year, political instability in Korea drew Japan and China into the Nis-Shin War, starting in August 1894. Opposed to the war aims of Japanese extremists, Arao Sei – daring to go against the tide of a popular war - refused to fight. Instead, he went into spiritual retreat at the Zen Jakuōji Temple in Kyoto, where he wrote several thought pieces about the war and his hopes for a just and lasting peace. (17) Nezu, still on active duty, participated fully in the war. He recruited not only graduates of Nis-Shin Bōeki Kenkyūjo but Hankou associates of Arao to serve as military interpreters and spies, a total of more than seventy persons. Nine of his recruits (the “Nine Martyrs”) were captured and executed by Chinese authorities. Out of penance and remorse, Nezu went into retreat at the Zen Jakuōji Temple for four-and-a-half years. He came out of retreat only after Prince Konoe Atsumaro 近衛篤麿 (1863-1904), the founder and head of Tō-A Dōbun Kai, entreated him in March 1900 to serve as secretary general (kanjichō 幹事長) of Tō- A Dōbun Kai in Tokyo, 1900-14, and as head or president (inchō 院長) of a new school, Nanjing Dōbun Shoin (renamed Tō-A Dōbun Shoin in 1901), 1900-23. Nezu’s reputation and skills cleared the way for the school’s founding in May 1900 with support from both Japanese and Chinese authorities, and then its relocation to Shanghai for safety reasons in late August 1900. In Shanghai it took the new
name Tō-A Dōbun Shoin effective in May 1901 (from which year its “first class” \textit{dai ikkisei} 第一期生] is regularly dated). \(18\)

In 1889, Arao Sei had attempted to recruit students for his Nis-Shin Bōeki Kenkyūjo through a system of publically-funded scholarships from local prefectural governments, his way paved by letters of introduction from high government officials. To finance a non-government school by such a method was itself a result of thinking outside the box. Now, a similar method was utilized by Tō-A Dōbun Kai, the formal sponsor of Tō-A Dōbun Shoin. In a letter dated December 1899, Prince Konoe, the respected president (\textit{kaichō} 会長) of Tō-A Dōbun Kai, spelled out the purposes of the new China school and solicited each of Japan’s forty-three prefectures and metropolises to sponsor “two to three or more prefecture-financed students (\textit{ryūgakusei} 留学生 [studying outside of Japan])” for a three-year period at an annual cost of 240 yen for tuition and expenses. The results were dismal. Only the prefectures of Hiroshima, Kumamoto, and Saga sent publicly-funded students in 1900. But for the “first class” of 1901, after Nanjing Dōbun Shoin had moved to Shanghai and taken the new name of Tō-A Dōbun Shoin, a more determined effort at student recruitment, spearheaded by Nezu Hajime himself, was undertaken. Five veterans (including Inoue Masaji, author of the Arao Sei biography) were sent to every major region of Japan on speaking tours. The result was that one metropolis and sixteen prefectures sent 51 publically-funded students (\textit{公費留学生}) along with 4 self-funded students (\textit{私費留学生}) for a class of 55, up from a mere 20 students the previous year. \(20\) As Tō-A Dōbun Shoin’s reputation spread and as China became more central to the Japanese economy, politics, and life, more and more individual prefectures sponsored students. The publically-funded students stand out, in fact, because they were carefully screened and selected. \(21\) The distribution of Shoin students from nearly every prefecture of Japan is dramatically demonstrated by two maps prepared by Fujita Yoshihisa, based on questionnaire surveys, for students in classes 16 through 39 (1917-40) and 40 through 46 (1941-47). \(22\)

\textbf{The China Study Curriculum of Tō-A Dōbun Shoin: An “Area Studies” Program}

My 1986 article, “Chinese Area Studies in Prewar China: Japan’s Tōa Dōbun Shoin in Shanghai, 1900-1945,” asserts that Nis-Shin Bōeki Kenkyūjo and Tō-A Dōbun Shoin were the world’s first examples of an area studies (\textit{chiiki kenkyū} 地域研究) type curriculum. The article identifies five features as necessary to qualify for an “area studies” designation: 1) language study, with emphasis on the language of current usage, both spoken and written, 2) emphasis on contemporary aspects of a geographical region, 3) multidisciplinary approaches across the social science disciplines of economics, geography, history, politics, anthropology and culture, and sociology, and across the humanities fields of language and literature, philosophy, religion, and the arts, 4) specialized libraries with extensive foreign language holdings, and 5) fieldwork, for language and research
Area studies is a term popularized in the United States after World War II. The history of area studies in America and Japan is strikingly different, however. The most fundamental difference lies in their origins. Japanese area studies arose from below - bottom-up - out of the insights, experiences, and commitments of Arao Sei, with the cooperation of his isshin dōtai Nezu Hajime. The US version descended from on high - top-down - a direct outgrowth of post-World War II national defense fears and anxieties. It grew not out of educational or trade needs as in Japan but out of national security needs and the wartime Office of Strategic Services (OSS), an intelligence agency established in June 1942.

After 1945, the perceived threat of the Soviet Union (and after 1949 of communist China) drove the US government to channel money openly and sometimes clandestinely to leading universities, some of them with hidden ties to intelligence entities like the postwar Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), successor to OSS. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, Cold War communism vanished as a core threat. Strategic thinking in the US shifted away from border-defined “area” entities to borderless globalization, in line (it was thought) with the latest strategic interests of the United States and its transnational corporations. As a result of this shift away from bordered entities, many area studies programs at universities faced cutbacks in university, foundation, and government support, and underwent a crisis of identity.

The nature of area studies in the United States and its present status is a subject of much recent discussion. Several major perspectives are well represented by three thoughtful reviews by senior scholars at leading universities. Bruce Cumings, Professor of History at University of Chicago and an area expert in Korean Studies (best known for his trenchant analyses of the Korean War), has written a carefully researched overview of area studies and its funding history that emphasizes US military goals and purposes. Its title is “Boundary Displacement: The State, the Foundations, and Area Studies during and after the Cold War,” and is highly recommended. A very different article, emphasizing the positive contributions of area studies to “the deparochialization of the US social sciences and humanities,” is by David L. Szanton of the University of California, Berkeley, entitled “The Origin, Nature, and Challenges of Area Studies in the United States.” A third article by Andrew C. Walder, professor of Sociology at Stanford University, under the title of “The Transformation of Contemporary China Studies, 1977-2002,” reveals that the author is “encouraged” and “optimistic” about the current state of China Studies in the disciplines of Political Science, Sociology, and Economics. Walder reminds his readers, “Lest one be tempted by the tired old caricature of a government-funded cold war machine that sought to train intelligence specialists for purpose of empire, we should remember that many, if not most students attracted to China studies in the decade after 1966 were initially motivated by opposition to the
Vietnam war and ideological fascination with China under Mao [Zedong].” (27) Each of these overviews includes valuable insights. One emphasizes narrow national security purposes of Cold War-era area studies, the second underlines broad successes of area studies in affirming “the distinctive social and cultural values, expressions, structures, and dynamics that shape the societies and nations beyond Europe and the United States” (p. 2), and the third expresses optimism about “disciplinary China scholarship” (p. 333) and its contributions to the disciplines of Economics, Sociology, and Political Science (pp. 333-336).

To use myself as an example, I am a product of area studies training at Columbia University (1965-76), working within the discipline of History. Like Arao Sei who refused to fight in the Nis-Shin War of 1894-95, I refused to fight in America’s shameful Vietnam War. On principle, I would not serve as a government spy, and I am opposed to American imperialism and the current US military-industrial-corporate-government complex that wantonly violates international law in ongoing wars of choice (incited and provoked in many cases by open and clandestine American intelligence and military operations). In the spirit of Szanton and Walder, my area studies research is free of political restrictions. In my teaching and research, I try not to be a tool of America’s post-Cold War and post-911 militarized security state, and to my knowledge few of my area studies colleagues are.

The Cumings critique is real, and must be understood, because it was strategic considerations that caused area studies to be funded over time and that financed clandestine projects. The same strategic considerations lie behind the current federal government National Security Education Act (NSEA) of 1991, and its National Security Education Program (NSEP) that “oversees nine critical initiatives designed to attract, recruit, and train a future national security workforce.” (28) Despite the belligerent tone of the NSEA and NSEP, it must not be forgotten that Cold War area studies managed to contribute to the Szanton goal “to deparochialize US- and Euro-centric vision of the world” (Szanton, p. 2), and area studies continues to enrich the disciplines of Sociology, Political Science, and Economics. Without postwar area studies, in fact, today’s dynamic fields of World History and International Studies are inconceivable. Although born out of national defense considerations, then, area studies in the US has exercised a positive influence in education generally and in many academic disciplines.

To return to Japan, the area studies curriculum of Tō-A Dōbun Shoin and before that of Nis-Shin Bōeki Kenkyūjo go back to Arao’s understanding of Japan’s knowledge-deficit about China and Chinese trade practices. In 1889-90, Arao returned to Japan to sell his view (29) that trade relations with China - a keystone of Japan’s long term prosperity - required the training of young Japanese in Chinese language (通弁対話 [41], 支那語 [45]), in English (英語 [45]), in local customs (習慣風俗 [39], 風土人情 [39], 風俗慣習 [41, 42], 風俗人情 [45]), in Chinese currency and
weights and measures (41, 45), in products (物品 [42, 45]), in trade practices (無法の商法 [41]; 支那内地商業上の実際 [42]), and in bargaining and price negotiations (販売の掛引 [45]). These topics are very sophisticated, and well ahead of their time. Many are included in the 1890 first-year curriculum of Nis-Shin Bōeki Kenkyūjo (p. 31). That curriculum is expanded on in the 1901 first-year curriculum of Tō-A Dōbun Shoin (p. 728), and expanded further in the March 1930 4-year curriculum schedule of Tō-A Dōbun Shoin (pp. 132-33). Compared to US area studies for international business today, these courses are more thorough, demanding, systematic, and complete, because US business courses like to take short cuts and assume that businessmen around the world all know English anyway. The area studies curriculum of these Japanese schools is commendable and, in fact, quite amazing in their achievements, purposes, and uses.

Final Thoughts

Allow me to end with some final thoughts, while thinking outside the box.

From 1901 onward, most Shoin students received full public funding (kōhi 公費), paid for by prefectures and supplemented by other sponsors including Tō-A Dōbun Kai and the Foreign Ministry 外務省. Meanwhile, state funds (kokuhī 国費) covered most administrative costs of the school. Education was free for these students. Despite this “giveaway,” graduates were under no obligation to repay their costs. (30) In Arao Sei’s mind, this free education was anything but a giveaway. In Hakata in 1889 Arao postulated that institute graduates would engage broadly in business and trade. Through career activities, they would help to secure the foundations of the Japanese economy, enhance Japan’s national prestige (kokui 国威), help spread the flag to foreign ports of Asia, and move Japan in the direction of becoming “the Great Britain of the East” (Tōyō no Eikoku 東洋の英国). (31) As an example of repayment, Arao had only to look at himself. Trained in the military, his education had been free and he became a “total military man.” But then in 1889 he left the military. Outside the military, his contribution to his country could be even greater. Graduates of his new school, he was certain, would serve their country in all different lines of work, so that repayment of tuition and expenses was not an issue.

Cold War-era US government-funded language and area training had much this same trust in career outcomes. No repayment was required. All careers could contribute to public knowledge and the national interest. Things have changed. In the new post-Cold War world under the US National Security Education Act of 1991, federal scholarships for language and area training come with strings attached. The National Security Education Program specifies that recipients of federal funds for undergraduate or graduate training “are required either to serve in the field of education or in government service for a period between one and three times the length of the award.” (32) One of the nine NSEP initiatives specifies, “In return for support, award recipients
agree to work in qualifying national security positions for at least one year.”

The vast majority of Dōbun Shoin graduates entered business careers. In times of war, not a few served in the Japanese government and military, assisting Japan’s imperialist wars and expansion. But serving in government was never a quid pro quo of training. US imperialism since 1991 has gone further in this respect.

With regard to the US, at the end of more than half a century of American domination of much of the world, the US is behaving like a wounded animal. Consumed by extreme paranoia, the militarized American security state of today targets and kills foreign “terrorists” at will, and sacrifices even its own citizens. The structure of this system is grounded on a powerful and largely unregulated military-industrial-corporate complex that “buys” US politicians through our corrupted system of campaign financing. Elected politicians are then beholden to pass laws that favor their campaign donors, whose support is needed for the next election cycle. Overseas, raw force is employed too hastily, cheered on by weapons manufacturers and their political puppets. To achieve these late-imperialist ends, area studies specialists are still needed. But informed area studies voices lack the influence of the voices of money, power, and aggression.

Morally, America has lost its way. Much of our national discourse since 9/11 in 2001 is dominated by fabricated paranoia and mindless ideology. (Most Americans, to my amazement, have been brainwashed by “security state” propaganda and by ridiculous claims that extremist Muslims of the Middle East hate “the American way of life” and “American freedoms.” Not at all. What Middle East Muslims hate is American imperialism and specifically US support of repressive regimes that control the flow of oil.)

I often think that what America needs is less violence at home, fewer guns, less of a socio-economic gap between the top 1 percent and a declining middle class, better and more equal education, better health care, and less public subsidies for sugar, GMO agriculture, and junk food that damage our health.

But we could also use more “Nezu Hajime,” especially his blended Confucian-Buddhist values that he loved to expound to his students: moral principles (J. rinri 倫理), and also the three fundamental paths of the Daxue 大學 [The Great Learning] – knowing the highest virtue (Ch. ming mingde 明明德), loving the people (Ch. qinmin 親民), and arriving at the supreme good (Ch. zhiyu-zhishan 止于至善). (34)

(1) Inoue Masaji 井上雅二, Kyojin Arao Sei 『巨人荒尾精』[Arao Sei, A Giant], with supplement by Murakami Takeru 増補編者 村上武 (Sakura Shobō 差久良書房, 1910;
photoreprint, 東光書院出版部, 1994).


(3) For the phrases “total military man” and “commercial and industrial arbiter,” see Arao Sei, speech at Hakata, December 1889, in Inoue Masaji, Kyojin Arao Sei, 38 and 39. Arao’s broader assessment of China submitted to the Army General Staff as “Fukumei sho” 復命書 [Report on China] (May 1889), emphasizes the need for peaceful cooperation rather than military confrontation, and is reprinted and discussed in Tō-A Dōbun Shoin Daigaku shi, 17-20.


(5) Arao Sei, speech at Hakata, in Inoue Masaji, Kyojin Arao Sei. See Arao’s use of the terms 実地 (44, 45) and 実地研究 (40).

(6) “外国に対等の力を有し、我国威を拡張するには、商工業の発達を謀り、外国より金銭を引き入るの手段に越す者あるべからず．．．．” Arao Sei, speech in Hakata, December 1889, to a Japanese audience, quoted in Inoue Masaji, 38.

(7) Fujita Yoshihisa 藤田佳久, Nit-Chū ni kakeru: Tō-A Dōbun Shoin no gunzō 日中に懸ける : 東亜同文書院の群像 [To Bridge Japan and China: The Tō-A Dōbun Shoin Group] (Nagoya: Chū-Nichi Shinbunsha, 2012), 32-25, provides names of Arao’s associates at Hankou and details about this data gathering. For fuller detail, see Inoue Masaji, Kyojin Arao Sei, 18-35.

(8) For details, see Tō-A Dōbun Shoin Daigaku shi, 29-34.

(9) For Shinkoku tsūshō sōran, see the richly detailed discussion of Fujita Yoshihisa 藤田佳久, Tō-A Dōbun Shoinsei ga kiroku shita kindai Chūgoku no chūki zō 東亜同文書院生が記録した近代中国的地域像 [Views of Modern China’s Geography, as Recorded by Tō-A Dōbun Shoin Students] (Kyoto: Nakanishiya Shuppan, 2011), 12-51.

(10) Tō-A Dōbun Shoin Daigaku shi, 245.

(11) Ibid., 27.

(12) Ibid., 24-28 and 245-46 contains excellent information about Nezu.

(13) Ibid., 21, 28, 249.

(14) Fujita Yoshihisa, Nit-Chū ni kakeru, 35-37, speaks about Arao’s efforts with letters from high officials.


(18) Reynolds, “Training Young China Hands,” 221-24 and 230-33, discusses these various points with footnote citations.

(19) *Tō-A Dōbun Shoin Daigaku shi*, 79-80, details the recruitment effort, its results, and the text of the Konoe letter. On Konoe’s initial involvement in the creation of Tō-A Dōbun Kai after being approached in 1897 by three close associates of the late Arao Sei, see Reynolds, “Training Young China Hands,” 224-25.

(20) *Tō-A Dōbun Shoin Daigaku shi*, 79, 86, and 397-402.

(21) Ibid., 90.


(23) Douglas R. Reynolds, “Chinese Area Studies in Prewar China: Japan’s Tōa Dōbun Shoin in Shanghai, 1900-1945,” *The Journal of Asian Studies*, 45.5 (November 1986), 945-970. The definition of “area studies” is found on pages 246-47; for the application of these five features to Tō-A Dōbun Shoin, see pages 954-64.


(27) Ibid., 340n3.
(28) “National Security Education Program” in http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Security_Education_Program (accessed November 30, 2014). This site enumerates the nine initiatives designed “to enhance the national security of the U.S. by increasing the national capacity to understand and interact effectively with foreign cultures and languages.”

(29) The following terms are quoted from Arao’s speech in Hakata, December 1889, in Inoue Masaji, Kyojin Arao Sei, 38-47.

(30) Ibid., 73; also, 90.

(31) Arao speech in ibid., 45-46.


(33) “National Security Education Program.”

(34) Tō-A Dōbun Shoin Daigaku shi, 89-91; for a lengthy exposition of these principles by Nezu, see his transcribed lecture of September 14, 1903, and his two-part lecture of November 4 and 5, 1903, on pages 718-26.